Oral (DN > DM)VER-52296 manufacturer Region vmPFC A priori ROIsaNon-Moral(EM > EN) ?Difficultz-valuePeak MNI coordinates 0 MNI coordinates 4 50 ? 563.27 t-Statistic 3.vmPFCROIs, regions of interest ��-Amatoxin site corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from previous studies: aYoung and Saxe (2009). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.DISCUSSION The aim of the study reported here was to examine how the brain processes various classes of moral choices and to ascertain whether specific and potentially dissociable functionality can be mapped within the brain's moral network. Our behavioral findings confirmed that difficult moral decisions require longer response times, elicit little consensus over the appropriate response and engender high ratings of discomfort. In contrast, easy moral and non-moral dilemmas were answered quickly, elicited near perfect agreement for responses and created minimal discomfort. These differential behavioral profiles had distinct neural signatures within the moral network: relative to the appropriate non-moral comparison conditions, difficult moral dilemmas selectively engaged the bilateral TPJ but deactivated the vmPFC, while easy moral dilemmas revealed the reverse findinggreater vmPFC activation and less engagement of the TPJ. These results suggest a degree of functional dissociation between the TPJ and vmPFC for moral decisions and indicate that these cortical regionshave distinct roles. Together, our findings support the notion that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, moral cognition makes Fexible use of different regions as a function of the particular demands of the moral dilemma. Our neurobiological results show consistency with the existing research on moral reasoning (Moll et al., 2008) which identifies both the TPJ and vmPFC as integral players in social cognition (Van Overwalle, 2009; Janowski et al., 2013). The vmPFC has largely been associated with higher ordered deliberation (Harenski et al., 2010), morally salient contexts (Moll et al., 2008) and emotionally engaging experiences (Greene et al., 2001). Clinical data have further confirmed these findings: patients with fronto-temporal dementia (FTD)deterioration of the PFCexhibit blunted emotional responses and diminished empathy when responding to moral dilemmas (Mendez et al., 2005). Additionally, lesions within the vmPFC produce a similar set of behaviors (Anderson et al., 1999). Unlike healthy controls, vmPFC patients consistently endorse the utilitarian response when presented with high-conflict moral dilemmas, despite the fact that such a response often has an emotionally aversive consequence (Koenigs et al., 2007). This clinical population is unable to access information that indicates a decision might be emotionally distressing, and they therefore rely on explicit norms that maximize aggregate welfare. This signifies that the vmPFC likely plays a role in generating pro-social sentiments such as compassion, guilt, harm aversion and interpersonal attachment (Moll et al., 2008). In the experiment presented here, differential activity was observed within the vmPFC in response to easy moral dilemmas, suggesting that when a moral dilemma has a clear, obvious and automatic choice (e.g. pay 10 to save your child's life), this region supports a neural representation of the most motivationally compelling and `morally guided' option. In other words, the vmPFC appears sensitive to a decision that has a low cost and high benefit result. This.Oral (DN > DM)Region vmPFC A priori ROIsaNon-Moral(EM > EN) ?Difficultz-valuePeak MNI coordinates 0 MNI coordinates 4 50 ? 563.27 t-Statistic 3.vmPFCROIs, regions of interest corrected at P < 0.05 FWE using a priori independent coordinates from previous studies: aYoung and Saxe (2009). See footnote of Table 1 for more information.DISCUSSION The aim of the study reported here was to examine how the brain processes various classes of moral choices and to ascertain whether specific and potentially dissociable functionality can be mapped within the brain's moral network. Our behavioral findings confirmed that difficult moral decisions require longer response times, elicit little consensus over the appropriate response and engender high ratings of discomfort. In contrast, easy moral and non-moral dilemmas were answered quickly, elicited near perfect agreement for responses and created minimal discomfort. These differential behavioral profiles had distinct neural signatures within the moral network: relative to the appropriate non-moral comparison conditions, difficult moral dilemmas selectively engaged the bilateral TPJ but deactivated the vmPFC, while easy moral dilemmas revealed the reverse findinggreater vmPFC activation and less engagement of the TPJ. These results suggest a degree of functional dissociation between the TPJ and vmPFC for moral decisions and indicate that these cortical regionshave distinct roles. Together, our findings support the notion that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, moral cognition makes Fexible use of different regions as a function of the particular demands of the moral dilemma. Our neurobiological results show consistency with the existing research on moral reasoning (Moll et al., 2008) which identifies both the TPJ and vmPFC as integral players in social cognition (Van Overwalle, 2009; Janowski et al., 2013). The vmPFC has largely been associated with higher ordered deliberation (Harenski et al., 2010), morally salient contexts (Moll et al., 2008) and emotionally engaging experiences (Greene et al., 2001). Clinical data have further confirmed these findings: patients with fronto-temporal dementia (FTD)deterioration of the PFCexhibit blunted emotional responses and diminished empathy when responding to moral dilemmas (Mendez et al., 2005). Additionally, lesions within the vmPFC produce a similar set of behaviors (Anderson et al., 1999). Unlike healthy controls, vmPFC patients consistently endorse the utilitarian response when presented with high-conflict moral dilemmas, despite the fact that such a response often has an emotionally aversive consequence (Koenigs et al., 2007). This clinical population is unable to access information that indicates a decision might be emotionally distressing, and they therefore rely on explicit norms that maximize aggregate welfare. This signifies that the vmPFC likely plays a role in generating pro-social sentiments such as compassion, guilt, harm aversion and interpersonal attachment (Moll et al., 2008). In the experiment presented here, differential activity was observed within the vmPFC in response to easy moral dilemmas, suggesting that when a moral dilemma has a clear, obvious and automatic choice (e.g. pay 10 to save your child's life), this region supports a neural representation of the most motivationally compelling and `morally guided' option. In other words, the vmPFC appears sensitive to a decision that has a low cost and high benefit result. This.
